Written by Nikolai Kutsch and Philippe Lefevre. Nikolai is an undergraduate international exchange student from North Carolina State University, North Carolina, US, who is studying Politics this year at the University of Surrey. Philippe is the Associate Director of the CBE.
Less than a week after her ascension to president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen addressed the African Union in Addis Ababa in December 2019 with what she called a “strong political message.” She had embarked on her first foreign trip seeking to usher in a Commission that was truly global, collaborating with partners in Africa – but also South America and Asia – as equals.
Yet lofty promises of partnership at eye-level were quickly drowned out by a cacophony of crises demanding immediate attention at the cost of those previous goals. Between a pandemic and wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, progress on that Commission’s inaugural foreign policy project stalled. Unequal distribution of coronavirus vaccines were followed by cuts to development aid. In five years, the gap between the EU and the Global South seemed to widen rather than narrow.
Exactly five years after her visit to Ethiopia and again less than a week since another commission led by her had taken office, von der Leyen found herself in Montevideo promoting the new MERCOSUR trade agreement. The deal with Latin America was decades in the making and offered von der Leyen another chance to prove she was serious about her global Commission.
However, days before the second von der Leyen commission was formed, von der Leyen’s sincerity came into question. POLITICO reported on an internal EU document proposing sizable cuts to EU delegation offices across the world. While the plan would not shut down any of the 145 locations, it called for slashing “high dependence on local staff,” presumably through layoffs, limited-term contracts and consolidation of regional hubs run by the European External Action Service (EEAS), which conducts EU diplomacy.
That document does not represent official policy, but has sparked debate about how the new commission will conduct its global outreach within the frame of a tightened purse. Newly appointed Commission vice president and EU high representative for foreign affairs Kaja Kallas was quick to disown the plan’s proposals, asserting the current international climate needed “more Europe, not less.”
Kallas may struggle to translate her reassuring words into action within the bounds of a tangibly more rightwing European Commission whose budgetary constraints leave its diplomatic branch with minimal wiggle room. In particular, Commission decision-makers are weighing options that will allow them to maintain a punchy worldwide presence while avoiding a repeat of the 2024 overspending that triggered the current push for fiscal restraint at the EEAS.
One of the most recent avenues the EU has pursued to achieve that goal has been its Global Gateway, originally set out in 2021 by von der Leyen and Kallas’s predecessor Josep Borrell. Described as a counterbalance to China’s worldwide Belt and Road Initiative, it represents a shift towards greater engagement with regions of critical interest to the EU, including Africa, Latin America and Asia – the same areas where EU delegations could face staffing cuts.
It is particularly with respect to China’s vast global network that some in the EU have expressed concern about power vacuums being created in regions where the EU could reduce its presence. Kallas has echoed this sentiment in the context of the MERCOSUR agreement with the EU’s South American partners, having said during her November confirmation hearings that the “void will be filled” by China if the EU did not secure the deal first. This latter aim – preventing China’s economic expansion – may rise in importance as the EU seeks to convince the incoming administration of U.S. president-elect Donald Trump of its importance as an ally.
The American government transition, in addition to the change of government in Germany and France, mean that the geopolitical dynamics informing the EU’s foreign policy will be considerably shaken up by the spring. While leaked documents and leaders’ statements might not carry the same weight as actual policy, they do point to a real, ongoing discussion within the EU about setting diplomatic priorities, which will inevitably mean deciding whether and where to cut embassy staff.
As von der Leyen and Kallas wait to see how the coming months unfold, they risk issuing promises of a “global Commission” that they are unable to follow through on. In the meantime, EU diplomats overseas are left waiting to see whether they will be invited to play a role in a “more Europe, not less” approach – or whether their jobs as conduits of Europe’s international influence will become collateral damage to austerity in Brussels.
