The November presidential election victory for Donald Trump, followed by Republican successes in holding the House and taking back the Senate was a shock to many in Europe, but should not have been a surprise.

While the Democrats deployed a well-organised and seemingly-effective traditional ground game targeting women, the young and minorities – supposedly the trifecta that would sweep Kamala Harris to power, the Republicans simply moved the battlefield. Happy to cede the front lawns and mailboxes of the suburbs and byways to their opponents, the GOP took the campaign battle to the information highway with a relentless deluge of simple, yet powerful messages around the issues that mattered to voters: the economy and immigration.

Here, the Centre for Britain and Europe’s Associate Director, Philippe Lefevre, who was on the ground in America during the US Election, suggests three areas where the Democrats failed, while CBE’s Americanist, Dr Mark Shanahan suggests why the GOP targeting was so effective.

Issues with the Democratic Ground Campaign:

The Over-Celebritsation of Campaigning

Reportedly based on Obama’s 2008 Hollywood campaign, it was clear on the ground that the Democrats placed high value on the role of celebrities and the idea that they would be able to turn out voters in a significant way. The focus was on celebrities of particular interest to women and younger voters, who were originally, as we recall, meant to be part of the “hidden majority” that would propel the Harris campaign to victory.

Partly, this helped further the disconnect that many swing voters felt between the Democratic campaign, and the Republican campaign, which – though also full of celebrities – frequently put front and centre people who attempted to highlight their “down-to-earth” credentials, even if the reality was not quite as clear for such individuals as Elon Musk and Donald Trump.

In hindsight, fundraising figures reveal the costs these celebrities wrought on the Democratic campaign, as well as its understanding of the key demographics needed to win votes. It’s no fault to run a campaign that inspired inclusiveness – this was a key theme. One good example of such interaction during the campaign that had the signs of a different approach was Harris’s Ellipse speech, which lacked celebrities and provided a clear focus on families, including former Republicans and those who had family members who given the ultimate sacrifice.

Nevertheless, this celebrity trend helped both exacerbate the disconnect and potentially push people into Republican hands.

Handling the Canvassing Campaign

Through witnessing a number of canvassing sessions, it was clear the sheer scope and size of the Democratic ground campaign was near historic. The ability to knock on thousands – even hundreds of thousands – of doors in just a few short days seemed like nothing short of a campaign automatically won.

The reality, however, when looking at the swing states – Pennsylvania sums the situation up – was that the same doors were knocked too often, and this infuriated voters due to the continual harassment of canvassers. This is different from the more digital approach of the Republican campaign – which fed into digital media streams more effectively.

This highlights an internal issue in the canvassing world: how often and how many contacts it takes to reach out to, and properly persuade voters. However, being sent out on rounds where doors had already been knocked twice on the very day you were there revealed a gap in the efficiency of volunteers – they simply did not have as effective a way to mobilise them.

The focus, once again, on the “tried and trusted” voter – the American male – and to narrow down on how they got their media, rarely in-person, clearly helped the Trump campaign mobilise its base more significantly than the Democrats managed to mobilise theirs. It is now questionable what exactly the Democratic base is.

Advert, Advert, Advert

Spending is a notoriously tricky thing to track effectively. From the numbers alone, you would imagine that the adverts and what was getting in front of people’s faces were relatively equal between the Democratic and Republican campaigns. On the ground, this was not the case.

In some key swing state areas, we saw two to three times the number of adverts reflecting the Republican campaign than we did the Democratic. It was not only overt Trump adverts or the more common anti-Harris adverts but also religious-themed adverts or those with a specific focus on “checking on your neighbour’s voting” – a really insidious, but effective tactic.

These permeated the Republican voter base more effectively than Democratic messaging. The media impression in these swing states during the key lead-up to the elections was an overwhelming sense that “politics is broken,” with only the occasional blue-tinted segment making it clear that the Democrats were in the running.

The Republican Super PACs played a key role here, showcasing their ability to run several campaigns at once with the loosest possible affiliations yet the strongest unofficial coordination. This was very impressive as a method of keeping the pressure on the Harris campaign and, ultimately, once again stopping millions of Democrats from going out to vote.

Keep it simple, stupid

While the Democrats fought the campaign on the terms that brought Obama to power in 2008, the Republicans offered up 2016 – with a twist. Donald Trump had nothing new to say, but his campaign team realised quickly that most Republican voters simply enjoyed his greatest hits. Trump was very active on the stump, criss-crossing the country and repeatedly returning to the seven swing states that would decide the election. The coming of Trump 2.0, if not quite the second coming, gained near mythical status following Trump’s close encounter with a bullet in Pennsylvania on July 13.

His free-wheeling speeches were policy-light, but generally attacked his opponents, stated the economy had been better with him in charge and would be again, and blamed the failings of the USA on immigrants and other countries, notably China. They were simple messages, easily digested through traditional media and offered a reassurance – albeit without substance – that America, in a dark place now, would emerge into a golden age in Trump 2.0. The evocation of a fictional America of strength, unity and prosperity simply played better with the Heartland, with men and with enough women to ensure victory.

But what iced the Republican cake was how these simple messages were delivered to Jo and Jess America not by eager canvassers knocking doors, but relentlessly through PAC advertising and even more so through social media. Pew noted earlier this year that the majority of American voters turn to X, formerly Twitter, for their political news, and with its owner Elon Musk in lockstep with Trump through this campaign, the platform became the place not for objectivity, nuance or reasoned debate, but to receive an incessant stream of pro-Republican messaging to their feeds, while liberal voices were de-prioritised by Musk’s tweaking of the platform’s algorithms. With little moderation and a highly agendered strategy, Musk’s platform became a deliberately unbalanced echo chamber favouring the right. This was far from a fair fight, but for the GOP, it was a very successful one.

2024 saw the battle for hearts and minds land squarely online and it was won by the biggest of the Tech Bros siding with Donald Trump. There is no guarantee that the Trump/Musk alliance will continue long-term, but it’s already striking fear into Democrat campaign strategists as they now turn their attentions to the 2026 midterms.