Authored by Zeng Ee Liew (Darill). Darill is a PhD candidate in Politics at the University of Surrey. His research centres on the diplomatic agency of non-sovereign entities, specifically examining how pro-democracy movements operate internationally.
There was huge anticipation amongst both the US and China that the recent state visit made by President Trump to China would serve as a way to “rest” Sino – US relations that have been marked by tariff wars and increasing escalation of rhetoric between the two sides.
One major sticking point in Sino – US relations, ever since official relations were established between the PRC and the US in 1979, was the issue of Taiwan. China views Taiwan as a renegade province, the last piece in the puzzle to a rejuvenated China, and has not given up on the use of force to reunify Taiwan with China. At the same time, the US, despite severing all official ties with Taiwan in 1979, still maintains unofficial ties with Taiwan through the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, and is the largest arms supplier to Taiwan.
As tensions between Taiwan and China continue to deteriorate, due to China’s dislike of the pro-independence President Lai Ching-te from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Taiwan has sought to increase its investments in defence by increasing its defence budget. In November 2025, the Executive branch released a defence budget worth US$ 40 billion, with the budget including up to US$ 12 billion to purchase various defence systems from the US, including air-defence missiles. The release of the increased defence budget also followed calls by the US to its allies to increase their defence spending, with the US increasingly viewing its allies as freeloading on US defence.
With strong bipartisan support for Taiwan in Congress, the arms sales package was quickly approved by senior lawmakers from both the Democratic and Republican parties after the State Department sent it to them for informal review in January. However, since the informal review by lawmakers, the arms package has languished within the State Department. During a call between Trump and Xi Jinping in February, the topic of arms sales was brought up, and Xi expressed his opposition to the arms sale to Trump. After that call, Trump said to reporters that he is considering what to do with the arms sales, given that Xi opposes them.
During the Trump – Xi summit in Beijing, Xi Jinping warned Trump on the issue of Taiwan, and how the issue, handled by the US, could bring the two countries into conflict. The ultimate aim for Xi is to convince Trump to take China’s position regarding how to handle the issue of Taiwan, and to delay, or even block, the arms sales package to Taiwan. Trump has also described the arms sales package as a potential “negotiating chip” with China when speaking to reporters on his trip to China, which has raised doubts amongst supporters of Taiwan about the willingness of the US to commit to supporting Taiwan’s defence. This very much fits with Trump’s transactional foreign policy. The Trump administration has been pushing the Chinese government to increase its purchase of American aeroplanes, ethanol, and soybeans to reduce the massive trade imbalance between the two countries, as Trump views this arms sales package as potential leverage.
The Trump – Xi summit ended with China agreeing to increase US agricultural purchases and place an order for 200 Boeing planes. The initial US readout of the summary of the visit omitted Taiwan entirely, which was considered by China to be a top priority. Later summaries of the summit revealed there were indeed discussions about Taiwan, and that Xi Jinping does not want to see a fight for independence.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio reassured that US policy towards Taiwan remained unchanged. However, the arms sales package remains in limbo. The use of arms sales as leverage also puts Taiwan in a difficult spot, as this arms sales package is part of its commitment to increase defence spending, to show that Taiwan is not freeloading off of America’s defences. At the same time, the Trump administration is potentially trying to use this package of arms sales as a negotiating chip with China. The potential delay of the arms sales package also sends a signal to Beijing that American support for Taiwan may be wavering or conditional.
America’s approach to how Taiwan’s security should be handled is a broader reflection of how the Trump administration has handled its relations with its other allies. It is clear that the Trump administration is seeking to have a more constructive relationship with China, even calling Xi Jinping a “towering leader out of central casting”. During the recent Shangri-La military forum in Singapore, Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth also declared that “[the US] respects [China’s] ambitions” in their military buildup, which has alarmed US allies in Asia, such as Japan and South Korea.
At the end, what does this mean for Taiwan? Having relied on the US for its security guarantees for decades, they face a situation where the US may no longer be a reliable ally for them. This is not a problem faced by Taiwan, but also for US allies in Asia and in Europe. However, the situation is even more acute, as it faces a direct military threat from China, with a leader seeking to cement some sort of legacy for himself. The government is increasing the defence budget to promote domestic defence spending, but faces opposition to that, as they see increased defence spending as provoking China.
With the Trump administration increasingly caught in the quagmire in Iran, still unable to pull itself out, will China take this opportunity of a weakened US to fulfil its goal of national reunification? Will the US even come to Taiwan’s aid should it happen? The answers to these remain elusive under the current Trump administration.
