Written by Professor Amelia Hadfield and Tea Zyberaj. Amelia is the Founding Director of the Centre for Britain and Europe, Director of CIFAL Surrey and Associate Vice President of External Engagement. Having graduated with a degree in Politics from the University of Surrey in 2022, Tea will shortly begin an MA in European Transformation and Integration at the College of Europe in Tirana, supported by a full scholarship from the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Enlargement and the Eastern Neighbourhood. She previously completed a Schuman traineeship at the European Parliament and holds an MSc in European Politics and Policy from UCL.
A political reset
After just two years in office, Keir Starmer has been replaced by Andy Burnham, making him Britain’s seventh prime minister in the decade since the Brexit referendum. With a political identity and priorities markedly different from those of his predecessor, his arrival provides an early test of whether the rapprochement with the EU, advanced and formalised under Starmer, can withstand another change in Downing Street. As mayor of Greater Manchester, he built his reputation around devolution and public transport before placing reindustrialisation and national renewal at the centre of his leadership platform. This domestic orientation has so far left the European dimension of his growth strategy less clearly articulated than it was under Starmer.
On the EU side, the initial response to Burnham was warm: in separate calls on his first day in office, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa welcomed closer cooperation. Yet this goodwill exists within an EU agenda dominated by the war in Ukraine, European defence, instability in the Middle East and the drive for greater competitiveness and economic security. Burnham’s premiership therefore raises two related questions: whether he can sustain and advance the unfinished reset inherited from Starmer, and whether the points of convergence between his domestic programme and EU priorities can be translated into new forms of functional cooperation.
An unfinished agenda
In Labour’s 2024 manifesto, Change, Starmer promised to deepen relations and ‘make Brexit work’ without reviving the divide between Leave and Remain or challenging Labour’s red lines on the single market, customs union and freedom of movement. His government pursued sectoral cooperation on this basis, gradually rebuilding trust with European partners and placing the relationship on a more structured footing.
This approach was formalised at the first UK–EU summit since Britain’s withdrawal, held in London on 19 May 2025. The two sides agreed on a new Strategic Partnership, expressed through a Joint Statement, a Common Understanding on a renewed bilateral agenda and a Security and Defence Partnership establishing six-monthly foreign and security policy dialogues and a framework for possible UK participation in EU civilian and military crisis-management operations.
By the time Starmer left office, arrangements for UK participation in Erasmus+ from 2027 had been finalised, while the legal agreements covering agri-food trade, the linkage of the British and European emissions-trading systems, a Youth Experience Scheme and possible UK participation in the EU electricity market remained unresolved. The postponement of the second UK–EU summit, scheduled for 22 July 2026, delayed the next opportunity to advance this package at leaders’ level, leaving Burnham to decide how prominently it should feature within his wider political project.
A domestic route to Europe
Burnham’s immediate emphasis is domestic. He inherits an economy still marked by weak productivity growth, public services under sustained pressure, historically low political trust and the electoral challenge posed by Reform UK. His response centres on an extensive devolution of power from Westminster, stronger public control of essential services and investment in transport, housing and regional industry. Whereas Starmer increasingly presented closer EU ties as a means of addressing the economic damage caused by Brexit, Burnham has located his programme of economic renewal primarily within the UK. This domestic orientation is likely to give the reset a more transactional and sectoral character, centred on deep, outcome‑focused bargains in areas where UK capabilities and EU priorities converge while leaving politically sensitive treaty questions off the table.
The most direct point of convergence between Burnham’s domestic programme and EU priorities lies in industrial cooperation. His wider ambition to develop British “sovereign capabilities” across shipbuilding, energetics, artificial intelligence and quantum technologies parallels the EU’s pursuit of “strategic autonomy”. Both agendas seek to strengthen their respective industrial bases and reduce exposure to external dependencies, including China’s influence over critical technologies and raw-material supply chains. Translating this alignment into cooperation would require closer coordination between British and European policy instruments. The UK can offer targeted access to its testbeds, regulatory sandboxes and research infrastructures as part of negotiations over British participation in EU initiatives and co‑funding for critical projects in batteries, hydrogen and microelectronics. Possible mechanisms include sectoral Memoranda of Understanding, linked public procurement pilots, a UK‑EU blended finance facility for cross‑border demonstrators and, where feasible, the mutual recognition of industrial standards to reduce friction in cross‑Channel supply chains.
In security and defence, Burnham could consolidate the Security and Defence Partnership agreed under the previous government by operationalising regular UK–EU crisis-management drills, reciprocal access arrangements and incremental UK participation in civilian CSDP missions. Practical steps could include joint contingency planning for critical infrastructure (energy grids, ports, logistics), interoperable logistics hubs in support of Ukraine and a UK–EU defence‑industry working group to coordinate surge capacity and sustainment for key platforms. Such arrangements would deepen operational trust while stopping short of full institutional integration, giving practical effect to a model of sectoral convergence around sovereign capabilities.
In research and innovation, practical and depoliticised re‑engagement in science and technology programmes could provide a further anchor for the reset. This could include Horizon Europe‑style collaboration, joint technology roadmaps, reciprocal researcher mobility and shared innovation clusters. Data‑sharing protocols for dual‑use research would further enable collaborative work on AI, quantum and defence‑relevant technologies while managing export‑control risks.
Foreign policy coordination would depend above all on continuity. Burnham would need to demonstrate sustained military support for Ukraine, coherence on sanctions and aligned diplomatic messaging. Operationalising the six‑monthly foreign and security policy dialogues into working groups with defined deliverables on sanctions enforcement, non‑proliferation and hybrid threats would convert political goodwill into more durable patterns of coordination.
Beyond the reset
For Brussels, the immediate test is whether Burnham proves a predictable counterpart by completing the negotiations already under way, clarifying the relationship Britain seeks and sustaining Britain’s support for Ukraine and its wider defence commitments. Doing so would demonstrate that the rapprochement has acquired sufficient political and institutional resilience to survive another change in Downing Street.
Burnham’s opportunity lies in showing how European cooperation can support regional reindustrialisation, economic security and technological capacity. In practice, a pragmatic, sectoral strategy focused on defence interoperability, industrial co‑investment, shared R&D and ongoing foreign‑policy coordination would give the relationship a distinct logic under his premiership rather than merely consolidate Starmer’s reset. Making that strategy credible will require London to match strategic clarity with institutionalised delivery. Further sectoral agreements would need long-term funding and procurement commitments, together with institutional bridges – such as permanent UK liaison teams embedded in EU agencies and reciprocal sectoral taskforces – to convert episodic dialogue into sustained cooperation. Such arrangements could reassure Brussels while delivering tangible benefits for UK regions and industries. Burnham may therefore bring the UK closer to Europe not by placing the EU at the centre of his politics, but by recognising that the national renewal he has promised cannot be delivered within national borders alone.
